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EU BORDER MANAGEMENT 
AFTER THE LISBON TREATY
Jorrit Jelle Rijpma*
Summary: This article looks at how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the 
management of the EU’s external borders. It examines the current 
treaty framework and the way in which the Community has made 
use of its powers in this policy ﬁ eld. It discusses the changes the Lis-
bon Treaty is likely to bring about and gives a short overview of how 
the future management of the external borders is taking shape in the 
absence of ratiﬁ cation of the Lisbon Treaty. The underlying theme of 
this contribution is the distinction between legislation and operational 
co-operation in this policy ﬁ eld. It points out a number of problems 
with the approach of fostering integration in the Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice through operational co-operation. It is argued that 
the Lisbon Treaty fails to provide a sounder legal framework for the 
EU’s joint operational activity in the AFSJ as a whole and the manage-
ment of the external borders in particular.   
1. Introduction
This article will examine how the Lisbon Treaty will affect the man-
agement of the EU’s external borders.1 The underlying theme of this con-
tribution is the distinction between legislation and operational co-opera-
tion in this policy ﬁ eld. Although external border management may be 
considered exemplary concerning developments in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) as a whole, it is unique in forming the only 
‘police power’ currently covered by the First Pillar of the EU. This article 
will ﬁ rst look at the meaning of ‘EU external borders’ and the current 
treaty framework for the management thereof. It will then consider how 
the Community has made use of its powers. It will continue with an ex-
amination of the changes the Lisbon Treaty is likely to bring about. The 
article will conclude with a short overview of how the future management 
* Jorrit Jelle Rijpma, Researcher, Law Department, European University Institute, Flor-
ence, Italy.
1 For the purpose of this paper, the term ‘management of external borders’ is understood 
as the processes and procedures associated with border checks, which take place at au-
thorised crossing points, including airports, and border surveillance, which is carried out 
on the so-called green (land) borders between authorised crossing points and along the blue 
(sea) borders. This deﬁ nition is largely the same as that given by Hills, who, however, does 
not include sea borders: A Hills, ‘The Rationalities of European Border Security’ (1996) 15 
European Border Security 1, 69.
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of the external borders is already taking shape in the absence of ratiﬁ ca-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty.2  
2. Current treaty framework for the management of external 
borders
It was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam that the Community ac-
quired powers for the regulation of its external borders. This came about 
through the transfer of policies from the Third Pillar of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Union (EU) to Title IV of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (EC) and the transformation of the Schengen 
acquis into European law. Article 62(2)(a) EC confers upon the Council 
the power to adopt measures on the crossing of the external borders of 
the Member States, establishing standards and procedures to be followed 
by Member States in carrying out checks on persons at such borders. 
On the basis of Article 66 EC, the Council can take measures to ensure 
co-operation between the relevant departments of the administrations 
of Member States in the areas covered by Title IV EC, and also between 
these departments and the Commission.3 
The transfer of powers in JHA to the First Pillar has been both par-
tial and gradual. Article 67 EC provided for a transitional period of ﬁ ve 
years in which the Commission shared its right of initiative with Mem-
ber States. This period ended on 1 May 2004, although the Commission 
remains obliged to take into account Member States’ requests to submit 
proposals to the Council. During the transitional period, decision-mak-
ing in the Council was unanimous, with a right of consultation for the 
Parliament. On the basis of the second indent of Article 68(2) EC, the 
Council extended, as of 1 January 2005, the co-decision procedure to 
Article 62(2)(a) EC.4 
Article 68 EC restricts the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
under Title IV EC. Only national courts from which no further judicial 
2  The external relations of EU border management will be outside the scope of this paper, 
although it should be stressed that the external dimension of EU border management is 
becoming increasingly important. See, for instance, Commission (EC), ‘Report on the evalu-
ation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency’ (Communication) COM (2008) 67 
ﬁ nal, 13 February 2008, 8.   
3  No agreement was reached on the legal basis for the Schengen Information System (SIS) 
and consequently it was brought under the Third Pillar on the basis of Article 2, paragraph 
4 of the Schengen Protocol. 
4  Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part 
Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure 
laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty [2004] OJ L396/45. In accordance with Protocol No 
35 on Article 67 EC, the Council has acted since 1 May 2004 by qualiﬁ ed majority on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament in order to 
adopt the measures referred to in Article 66.
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remedy is possible have a duty to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ. 
In an area that touches directly upon the civil liberties of EU citizens, this 
is obviously a regrettable anomaly. Although Article 67(2), second indent, 
EC calls upon the Council to take a decision on the adaptation of the 
Court’s powers after the transitional period, it has not done so.5
A further restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction is contained in Arti-
cle 68(2), excluding the Court’s jurisdiction over measures taken under 
Article 62(1) EC (the legal basis for measures related to the abolition of 
internal border controls) in so far as they relate to the maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.6 One could in-
terpret this paragraph as the Community equivalent of Article 35(5) EU, 
which aims to prevent the Court from pronouncing itself on the legal-
ity and proportionality of Member States’ law enforcement authorities. 
Peers, however, has argued it would not prevent the Court from ruling on 
the interpretation or validity of Community acts in a preliminary ruling 
procedure.7 Interestingly, its wording would also not prevent the Court 
from pronouncing itself on the correct interpretation of measures based 
on Article 62(2) or Article 66 EC relating to external borders. It would 
therefore be possible for the Court to rule for instance on the conform-
ity of the actions of national border guard authorities, even if it may be 
assumed that the Member States intended to exclude these enforcement 
authorities from the scope of the Court’s powers of review. 
It is imperative to realise that due to the opt-out of the United King-
dom and Ireland, the external borders of the Schengen area do not coin-
cide with the ‘external borders’ of the area in which there is free move-
ment for persons having this right under Community law. Likewise, the 
external borders of the Schengen area, because of the association with 
the Schengen acquis of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, 
as well as the exclusion of the non-European territories of the Schengen 
Member States, do not coincide with the external borders of the EU. 
It is the Schengen external borders, as initially deﬁ ned in Article 1 
of the Schengen Implementing Convention (CISA) that form the object of 
5  In 2006, the Commission did publish a Communication in which it proposed to cease ap-
plication of Article 68, but the Council has never taken any decision to that effect: Commis-
sion (EC), ‘Adaptation of the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with a view to ensuring more 
effective judicial protection’ (Communication) COM (2006) 346 ﬁ nal, 28 June 2006.
6  A similar exception is contained in the Schengen Protocol art 2(1).
7  S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Harlow, Longman 2000) 47. Case C-150/05 Jean 
Leon Van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië [2006] ECR I-9327 seems 
to conﬁ rm this approach. In this case, the ECJ ruled on the correct interpretation of the 
CISA which lay at the basis of a SIS entry made by Italian enforcement authorities, giving 
the referring Dutch court the tools to order the removal of the entry.
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Community competence. Whilst at the Schengen external borders, bor-
der procedures are regulated by EC law, at the non-Schengen EU exter-
nal borders it is the national law of the Member State in question that 
determines the procedure to be followed, albeit within the limits imposed 
by EU law.8 It is also important to point out that the Schengen external 
borders are deﬁ ned by reference to the Member States’ external borders. 
The new Article 69(4) FEU underlines once more that the powers cur-
rently contained in Article 62 EC leave the competence of Member States 
unaffected as regards the geographical demarcation of their borders, in 
accordance with international law.9
3. Legislation v executive action
The AFSJ is generally characterised by executive action and opera-
tional co-ordination as opposed to the ‘legislation-centred constitutional 
logic of the EU’.10 Bearing in mind the communitarisation of competences 
for the management of the external borders, this section will consider 
how far this qualiﬁ cation remains valid with respect to this policy. To 
what extent does Community action in this ﬁ eld remain distinct from 
that in other areas covered by the First Pillar?  
In order to answer this question, one should distinguish between 
executive action which has effects in law, ie which creates enforceable 
rights and obligations for third parties, and executive action which does 
not. Implementation of legislation by the Commission, the Council or 
regulatory agencies with decision-making power would fall under the 
former. Technical and scientiﬁ c assistance, as well as operational co-
ordination, be it by the Commission, the Council or a regulatory agency, 
would be covered by the latter. 
Walker in his discussion of the legislative/executive nature of the 
AFSJ opposes legislation to executive and operational action, without 
distinguishing between the latter two.11 He argues that both refer to the 
‘post-legislative (or in some cases non-legislation-based) phase of policy 
application and implementation.’ On the one hand, ‘executive’ is used to 
8  These limits concern the way in which EU citizens and their relatives with border cross-
ing rights based on the EU’s fundamental freedom of free movement are to be treated.
9  This was also stipulated in the 9th recital to Decision 2004/927/EC (n 4). Of course, 
Member States will always be under the obligation to comply with EU law in exercising this 
competence. See in this respect, Case C-146/89 Commission v UK [1991] ECR I-3533 on the 
extension by the UK of its territorial sea and the effects thereof on the activities of ﬁ shermen 
from other Member States.
10  N Walker, ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Od-
yssey’ in N Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004) 21-22.
11  Walker (n 10) 21-22.
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refer to ‘high’ governmental activity and ‘operation’ to ‘low’ bureaucratic 
or professional activity.12 In the discussion on the executive nature of the 
AFJS, one tends to underline the ‘on the ground’ or ‘practical’ nature of 
EU activity. In this context, however, the reference to ‘executive’ often 
carries with it the notion of law enforcement authorities’ powers of coer-
cion.13  
As Hoffman has argued, the extent of the European administrative 
space can only be appreciated by looking beyond the administration’s 
implementation activity.14 By deﬁ ning the nature of EU executive action 
more precisely, the distinction proposed between executive action which 
has legal effect and that which does not allows us to do just that. Consid-
ering that the EU functions as a system of multi-level or network govern-
ance, including in the AFSJ, a distinction based on the legal effect of EU 
administrative activity is preferred over a distinction based on the level at 
which this executive action takes place.15 
Since the expiry of the transitional period, legislation under Title IV 
EC now generally confers the power to take implementing measures on 
the Commission, under the supervision of a comitology committee.16 The 
ECJ has shown that it will closely scrutinise any retention of implement-
ing powers by the Council.17 In relation to the more ‘factual’ EU activity 
implementing Community law, there is however an absence of a clear legal 
framework. This may prove particularly problematic in relation to opera-
tional co-ordination in the AFSJ, where the co-operation between Member 
States may involve the exercise of coercive powers against individuals.
3.1 The building of a Schengen external borders acquis
In the ﬁ rst few years following the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, there was relatively little legislative activity in the ﬁ eld of 
12  Walker (n 10) 21-22.
13  Walker (n 10) 21-22.
14  H Hoffman, ‘Mapping the European Administrative Space’ (2008) 31 West European 
Politics 4, 665.
15  B Kohler-Koch and B Rittberger, ‘Review Article: The “Governance Turn” in EU Studies’ 
in U Sedelmeier and AR Young (eds), JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2005 
(Blackwell, Oxford 2006) 27-49. See also K Eder and HJ Trenz, ‘The Making of a European 
Public Space: The Case of Justice and Home Affairs’ in B Kohler-Koch (ed), Linking EU and 
National Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 111-134. 
16  See Article 202, third indent EC and Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ 
L184/23, as amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC [2006] OJ L200/11.
17  See the Court’s ruling in Case C-133/06 European Parliament v Council [2008] ECR-I 
3189, moving away from its more cautious approach in Case C-257/01 Commission v Coun-
cil [2005] ECR I-345.
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external borders management. Regulations concerning local border traf-
ﬁ c and common standards for the surveillance of land and sea borders 
envisaged in the 1999 Schengen Regulations Action Plan of the Council’s 
Frontiers Working Party were not adopted until 2006.18
Of course, a considerable acquis was already in place in the form of 
those parts of the Schengen acquis that were incorporated into the EU 
legal order by the Treaty of Amsterdam and that were assigned to the new 
legal bases provided for by that Treaty.19 It was the impending enlarge-
ment, however, reinforced by the sharp increase in sub-Saharan migration 
across the Mediterranean from 2000 onwards and the events of 9/11 that 
brought borders back onto the EU’s policy agenda.20 The December 2001 
JHA Council meeting agreed on the following four points: 1) to strengthen 
and standardise European border controls 2) to assist candidate States 
in organising controls at Europe’s future external borders by instituting 
operational co-operation 3) to facilitate crisis management with regard to 
border control and 4) to prevent illegal immigration and other forms of 
cross-border crime.21 Again without making any reference to possible leg-
islative initiatives, the Laeken European Council Conclusions of 14 and 
15 December 2001 asked the Council and the Commission to ‘work out 
arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external 
border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or 
common services to control external borders could be created.’22 
In response, the Commission came forward with its 2002 Commu-
nication on the integrated management of the external borders. In this 
communication, for the ﬁ rst time reference was made to the establish-
ment of a ‘common corpus of legislation’ in relation to the management of 
the common Schengen borders.23 In the short term, the most important 
18  Council Frontiers Working Party, ‘Action Plan: Revisions of the Schengen border control 
regulations’ Council Document 12479/99, 4 November 1999. 
19  Council Decision 1999/435/EC concerning the deﬁ nition of the Schengen acquis [1999] 
OJ L176/1 and Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining the legal basis for each of the 
provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis [1999] OJ L176/17.
20  J Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ in L Miles (ed), JCMS The European Union: Annual 
Review 2002/2003 (Oxford, Blackwell 2003) 124. See also H De Haas, ‘The Myth of Inva-
sion: Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union’ (IMI 
Research Report) (Oxford, October 2007) 15. Haas links this increase to a major anti-im-
migrant backlash in Libya in 2000. 
21  Results of the JHA Council Meeting, Brussels, 6-7 December 2001, Council Document 
14581/01, 13.
22  Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken European Council, 14 and 15 December 2001, No 
00300/1/01, point 42.
23  Commission (EC), ‘Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Mem-
ber States of the European Union’ (Communication) COM (2002) 233 ﬁ nal, 7 May 2002, 
12.
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measures envisaged remained the recasting of the Schengen acquis in a 
regulation (the Schengen Borders Code) and the long overdue adoption of 
measures on local border trafﬁ c.24 
The Communication further stated that by having recourse to Ar-
ticle 66 EC, the Community budget should contribute to the ﬁ nancing 
of a common policy. A ﬁ nancial burden-sharing system should be es-
tablished in the run-up to the creation of a complementary operational 
burden-sharing mechanism. The operational mechanism was to take the 
shape of a European Corps of Border Guards; a body endowed with a 
‘genuine operational inspection function’, which it could exercise either 
at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative.25 The Council’s 
Action Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the Member 
States largely adopted the Commission’s proposals, but was understand-
ably much more careful as regards the setting-up of a European Corps 
of Border Guards.26 It generally put much less emphasis on the eventual 
need for common legislation and ﬁ nancing, focusing instead on measures 
of an operational rather than legal nature giving the plan a very ‘prag-
matic’ orientation.27
Notwithstanding this practical approach, a wide range of legisla-
tive measures has been adopted which determine, either directly or in-
directly, the way in which the Schengen external borders are managed. 
These measures neither relate exclusively to the act of crossing an ex-
ternal border nor fully coincide with those envisaged in the Commission 
Communication or the Council’s Action Plan. This is ﬁ rst of all because 
the Court has construed the notion of ‘Schengen developing measures’ 
broadly. The effect of this is that all measures that, judged by their con-
tent and purpose, render parts of the Schengen acquis more effective 
qualify as such.28 As a result, measures developing the Schengen acquis 
on external borders adopted on the basis of Article 62(2)(a) EC and Article 
66 EC cover a broad range of legislative initiatives from the establishment 
of the EU’s border agency Frontex to common requirements regarding 
EU passports. In addition, a considerable number of measures that ﬁ nd 
24  Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) art 3.
25  Commission (EC) (n 23) 13.
26  Council, ‘Plan for the management of the external borders of the Member States of the 
European Union’ Council Document 10019/02, 14 June 2002, point 120. The plan was 
ofﬁ cially endorsed in the European Council Conclusions, Seville, 21-22 June 2002, point 
27.
27  J Monar, ‘The Project of a European Border Guard’ in M Caparini and O Marenin (eds), 
Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalised World (LIT Verlag, 
Münster 2006) 200.
28  Case C-77/05 United Kingdom v Council [2007] ECR I-1145 para 85 and Case C-137/05 
United Kingdom v Council [2007] ECR I-11593 para 56. 
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their legal basis in other areas of competence under Title IV EC (such 
as irregular migration, visa or asylum) or under the Third Pillar, include 
provisions which affect the way in which the Schengen external borders 
are managed. As such, the rules that make up the ‘Schengen external 
borders acquis’ are to be found across a broad range of measures, which 
can be roughly divided into ﬁ ve categories. 
One may ﬁ rst identify the Schengen borders acquis in a narrow 
sense: the measures that establish the border crossing regime at the 
Schengen external borders The essence of EU activity in the area of bor-
der management is to ensure respect for and correct application of these 
measures. The most important piece of legislation in this category is, of 
course, the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).29 A second category of legis-
lative measures consists of measures that aim to establish a degree of 
ﬁ nancial burden-sharing as regards the management of the Schengen 
external borders. Here the most important instrument is the External 
Borders Fund (EBF).30 A third category of measures relates to the es-
tablishment of centralised databases for the purpose of migration and 
border management: the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and Eurodac.31 A fourth category is made up of 
measures that penalise illegal entry, smuggling and trafﬁ cking.32 
The last category consists of institutional measures for the co-ordi-
nation of operational co-operation. Operational co-operation has been the 
cornerstone of the EU’s policy for the management of external borders. 
Many of the measures in the previous categories enable or facilitate oper-
ational co-operation between border guard authorities through ﬁ nancial 
support or information exchange. The 2002 Commission Communication 
put a lot of emphasis on the concept of operational burden-sharing, pool-
ing not only ﬁ nancial but also human and technical resources and pro-
29  Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2006] OJ L105/1. 
30  Decision 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 
2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ 
[2007] OJ L144/22.
31  Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establish-
ment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
[2006] OJ L381/4 and [2007] OJ L205/63. These Regulations repeal all provisions from 
CISA regarding SIS, although SIS II has yet to become functional; Regulation (EC) No 
767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data be-
tween Member States on short-stay visas [2008] OJ L218/60; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2725/2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of ﬁ ngerprints for 
the effective application of the Dublin Convention [2000] OJ L316/1. 
32  See, for instance, Council Directive 2002/90/EC deﬁ ning the facilitation of unauthor-
ised entry, transit and residence [2002] OJ L328/17 and Framework Decision 2002/946/
JHA on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence [2002] OJ L328/1.
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posing the establishment of a European Corps of Border Guards.33 The 
Council’s Action Plan on the External Borders had carefully concluded 
that ‘institutional steps could be considered’ which ‘could include a possi-
ble decision on the setting up of a European Corps of Border Guards.’34 
The most important steps for operational co-operation at the external 
borders, if not from a legal point of view, then from a symbolic one, has 
been the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 2004/2007 establish-
ing a Community agency for the coordination of operational cooperation 
at the external borders of the Member States (Frontex).35 This regulation 
was subsequently amended by Regulation (EC) No 863/2007.36 Both reg-
ulations are based on Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC. As the Court conﬁ rmed 
in Case C-77/05, the Frontex regulation constitutes a development of 
that part of the Schengen acquis in which the UK and Ireland do not 
participate, for which reason they have been excluded from the Agency.37 
The Commission’s proposal for an amendment of the Frontex Regulation 
added that the UK and Ireland were to be excluded, since the agency was 
to be regarded as a measure of solidarity applicable only to the countries 
participating in the Schengen acquis on external borders.38
The road to Warsaw, from where the Agency has been functioning 
since 2005, has been a winding one.39 The Council’s Action plan focused 
on practical initiatives rather than legislative measures. Informed by an 
Italian-led feasibility study into the setting-up of a European Border Po-
lice, it advocated the establishment of a ‘polycentric’ network structure 
consisting of ad hoc centres specialised in different areas of border man-
33  Commission (EC) (n 23).
34  Council (n 26) point 120.
35  Article 64(2) EC; Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agen-
cy for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union [2004] OJ L349/1 art 8a.
36  Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 (‘Rabit Regulation’) establishing a mechanism for the 
creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest ofﬁ c-
ers [2007] OJ L199/30.
37  Case C-77/05 (n 28).
38  Commission (EC), ‘Document accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as re-
gards that mechanism’ (Staff Working Document) SEC (2006) 953, 19 July 2006, 2-3. Here 
one could argue, however, that solidarity is a broader value underpinning Member States’ 
co-operation in general, as expressed in Article 2 EC. Under the Lisbon Treaty, solidarity 
underpins all co-operation on asylum, immigration and external borders. See the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) art 61(2).
39  Council Decision 2005/385/EC designating the seat of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union [2005] OJ L114/13.
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agement.40 It called for joint operations of national border guard agencies 
at the external borders and the creation of national contact points. The 
Council also followed the Commission’s suggestion to set up a Common 
Unit of External Border practitioners falling under the Council’s Strategic 
Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA). 
The Common Unit (or SCIFA+) consisted of the members of SCIFA 
and the heads of Member State border control services. Its task was to 
oversee the development of a common policy on external borders and 
act as a co-ordinator for the network structure and the joint operations 
proposed in the Action Plan. It was explicitly mentioned that SCIFA+ did 
not encroach upon the Commission’s powers in this ﬁ eld, stating that it 
would not involve legislative proposals or implementing measures in the 
meaning of Article 202 EC.41
Between July 2002 and March 2003, SCIFA+ approved a total of 
17 different programmes, ad hoc centres, pilot projects and joint opera-
tions.42 The Council has always maintained that these constituted inter-
governmental co-operation arrangements between Member States. De-
pending on how one deﬁ nes the term ‘measure’ in Articles 62(2)(a) and 
66 EC, one could argue that the Treaty does not directly confer upon 
the Council the competence to engage in such co-ordinating activities, 
but merely gives the Community legislator the power to adopt legislation 
for this purpose.43 This is because the EC Treaty lacks an equivalent of 
Article 36 EU which establishes a Coordinating Committee (Committee 
Article Trente-Six, CATS) made up of senior Member State ofﬁ cials in JHA 
with speciﬁ c co-ordinating tasks under the Third Pillar. The presidency’s 
report on the implementation of the joint activities expressly referred to a 
lack of legal basis for the setting-up of ad hoc centres and the carrying-
out of common operations.44 
The Presidency report further listed a number of concerns in rela-
tion to operational co-operation which ranged from the need for suitable 
planning, preparation and central operational co-ordination to a lack of 
40  Monar (n 27) 196.
41  Council (n 26) point 47.
42  Council, ‘Progress report on the implementation of the Plan for the management of the 
external borders of the Member States of the European Union and the comprehensive plan 
to combat illegal immigration’ Council Document 14708/02, 26 November 2002.
43  As Monar has noted, this study was ‘shaped by the input of national experts, who tended 
to defend national methods and organizational structures’ (n 27) 196. See for a critical 
analysis: Statewatch, ‘Cover-up! Proposed Regulation on European Border Guard hides 
unaccountable, operational bodies’ <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/EUbor-
derpolice.pdf> last accessed 15 April 2009.
44  Council, ‘Report on the implementation of programmes, ad hoc centres, pilot projects 
and joint operations’ Council Document 10058/1/03, 11 June 2003, 9-10.
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adequate evaluation.45 The Commission Communication in view of the 
Thessaloniki European Council noted that the limitations of SCIFA+ as 
a working party had been demonstrated.46 These limitations related to 
its large membership and wide agenda, but presumably also to its lack 
of a common approach.47 The Commission therefore argued that while 
‘certain more strategic co-ordination tasks could remain with SCIFA+, 
the more operational tasks could be entrusted to a new permanent Com-
munity Structure’.48 This became the Practitioners’ Common Unit (PUC), 
replacing SCIFA+ and consisting only of the heads of Member State bor-
der guard services. SCIFA remained responsible for the general strategy 
to set up an integrated border management system, while the PUC was 
to deal exclusively with operational issues.49 
Throughout the summer of 2003, irregular landings on the EU’s 
southern maritime borders continued to make headlines.50 The Thessalo-
niki European Council emphasised the importance of determining a more 
structured framework and the necessity of creating new institutional 
frameworks to enhance operational co-operation for the management of 
the external borders.51 The Commission, from the outset a proponent of 
more centralised co-operation, seized the opportunity and proposed the 
45  Council (n 44) 9-10.
46  Commission (EC), ‘Commission Communication in view of the European Council of 
Thessaloniki on the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and 
trafﬁ cking of human beings, external borders and the return of illegal residents’ (Commu-
nication) COM (2003) 323 ﬁ nal, 3 June 2003, 7. 
47  House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, Proposals for a European Border Guard, HL 
(2002-3) (London, 29th Report of Session 2002-03, 1 July 2003) 14. In informal discussions, 
a Council ofﬁ cial mentioned that each Member State was keen on having its own project. 
A Commission ofﬁ cial from DG JLS rather cynically remarked that the ad hoc centres were 
more occupied with the design of their logo than anything else. See also the anonymous 
Commission ofﬁ cial quoted in A Neal, ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins 
of FRONTEX’ (2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 2, 342. 
48  Commission (EC) (n 46) 7-8.
49  Council Conclusions (JAI), Luxembourg 5-6 June 2003 (Council Document 9845/03). 
The political role of SCIFA was also underlined by the Finnish Presidency of 2006, which 
envisaged SCIFA taking the lead in the implementation of integrated Border Management. 
Presidency note for the Informal JHA Ministerial Meeting, Tampere, 20-22 September 
2006, 2 <http://www.eu2006.ﬁ /news_and_documents/other_documents/vko36/en_
GB/1157615375954/> last accessed 15 April 2009.
50  Even if in a Member State like Italy numbers were actually declining throughout 2003, 
the phenomenon continued to be of great concern to the Member States involved. L Coslovi, 
‘Brevi note sull’immigrazione via mare in Italia e in Spagna’ (CeSPI, Rome January 2007). 
See also the Council’s Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration across the 
maritime borders of the European Union, a clear example of the Council’s executive role 
in operational co-ordination of the management of external borders (Council Document 
13791/03).
51  European Council Conclusions, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003, points 12 and 14.
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creation of Frontex.52 The Commission’s intention of coming forward with 
this proposal had already been welcomed by the European Council.53 The 
regulation was adopted in October 2004 after another summer witness-
ing the arrival of irregular migrants by sea.  
The establishment of Frontex shows how the co-ordination of opera-
tional co-operation, not unlike the competences in border management 
themselves, has gradually been communitarised. If one is willing to ac-
cept that the co-ordinating activities of SCIFA+/PUC constituted purely 
intergovernmental arrangements, the case of Frontex conﬁ rms that in 
the case of delegation to agencies, powers are often transferred vertically 
(from the national to the EU level) rather than horizontally (from Com-
munity institutions to specialised agencies).54 
If one is to consider the co-ordinating activities of SCIFA+/PUC as 
Community actions, it becomes clear that with the transfer of operational 
co-ordination from the PUC to Frontex, there has nevertheless been a 
shift from a Member-State driven co-ordination within the Council to the 
more supranational approach of a Community agency. Simultaneously, 
this shift has empowered the Commission because of its inﬂ uence on the 
agency.55 It could even be argued that the Commission, rather than SCI-
FA, is increasingly taking responsibility for more strategic co-ordination 
tasks, mapping out the general strategy for the integrated management 
of the external borders.56 
3.2 Operational co-ordination and co-operation 
A common corpus of legislation was only one of a number of elements 
which the Commission identiﬁ ed in its 2002 Communication as central to 
a policy for the management of external borders. The other components 
were of a much more practical nature and included the establishment of 
52  Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders’ COM (2003) 687 
ﬁ nal, 20 November 2003. 
53  European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 October 2003, under III. 
54  R Dehousse, ‘Misﬁ ts: EU Law and the misﬁ ts of European Governance’ (2002) Jean Mon-
net Working Paper 2 (New York), 12. See also the Rapporteur of the European Parliament, 
‘Report on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders’ (A5-0093/2004), tabled 
24 February 2004.
55  See E Busuioc, ‘Autonomy, accountability and control - the case of European agencies’ 
4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 5-8 September 2007, 17-18. 
56  See, for instance, Commission (EC), ‘Reinforcing the Management of the European Un-
ion’s Southern Maritime Borders’ (Communication) COM (2006) 733 ﬁ nal, 30 November 
2006 and the Council Conclusions on this Communication (Council Document 13231/06). 
The Commission will of course require the endorsement of the Council for such co-ordinat-
ing activities.
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common co-ordination and operational co-operation mechanisms, com-
mon integrated risk analysis and the training of staff in a European di-
mension.57 Indeed, the Council’s Action Plan for the Management of the 
External Borders and the implementation thereof was characterised by 
the ‘absolute prominence of the operational dimension.’58 
One can clearly see the origins of such an operational approach in 
the Commission’s 1988 Communication on the abolition of controls of 
persons at intra-Community borders. In relation to the question at which 
level ‘ﬂ anking measures’ necessary to achieve the free movement of per-
sons should be taken, the Commission stated that it was 
fully aware of the delicate nature and exercise of this kind, and it 
considers that attention should be focused on practical effectiveness 
rather than on matters of legal doctrine. Therefore … the Commis-
sion proposes that Community legislation in this ﬁ eld be applied 
only to those cases where the legal security and uniformity provided 
by Community law constitutes the best instrument to achieve the 
desired goal.59
This means that all other action was to be left to intergovernmental 
co-operation. Of course, the approach advocated here can be explained 
by the lack of competence at the time to proceed with Community legisla-
tion. At the same time, however, it underlines the importance of Member 
States’ sovereignty concerns and the emphasis on ‘practical effectiveness’ 
in response thereto. The Communication continued by stating that there 
would be a ‘large scope left to cooperation among Member States.’ That 
this co-operation took place more on the basis of ad hoc informal con-
tacts between administrations, rather than within an international treaty 
framework is evidenced by the host of informal, secretive bodies that de-
veloped in the ﬁ eld of JHA from the mid-1980s.60  
Schengen co-operation formed an exception to the extent that it was 
based on a legal framework, albeit an intergovernmental one. However, 
as Guiraudon has pointed out, this framework was never meant to cre-
ate a ‘constraining set of rules with monitoring mechanisms’, but much 
57  Commission (EC) (n 23) 12.
58  F Pastore, ‘Visa, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure and Current Evolution 
of the EU Entry Control System’ in N Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 124.
59  Commission (EC), ‘Commission Communication on the abolition of controls of persons 
at intra-Community borders’ (Communication) COM (88) 640 ﬁ nal, 7 December 1988, 6-7.
60  See S Lavenex and W Wallace, ‘Justice and Home Affairs - Towards a “European Public 
Order?”’ in H Wallace and W Wallace (eds), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2005) 459.
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rather to escape such legal control and constraints at the national level.61 
In respect of the communitarised parts of the AFSJ, this was remedied by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.   
Walker has observed that Member States’ sovereignty concerns are 
more likely to be triggered by ‘familiar and more symbolically loaded leg-
islation centred indices of national authority’ than by other forms of pol-
icy co-operation.62 As far as the management of the external borders is 
concerned, this seems to remain valid under Title IV EC, as exempliﬁ ed 
by the history of Frontex’s establishment and the continuing resistance 
of some Member States to a more centralised model of border agency.63
Fostering European integration in the AFSJ by focusing on the ‘mere 
technical’ co-operation between Member States’ competent authorities 
is, however, problematic. It fails to acknowledge the highly political and 
value-laden nature of the competences that are grouped in this policy 
ﬁ eld, or rather it acknowledges this highly political nature by masking 
it as non-political. Of course, ‘any decision about whether something is 
unpolitical is always a political decision’.64 However, the co-ordination of 
operational co-operation in the AFSJ should not be allowed to substitute 
policy and lawmaking processes as deﬁ ned in the EU Treaties and ac-
cording to which the future direction of the European project in a given 
area would normally be determined.
In addition, it would be wrong to consider the co-ordination of opera-
tional co-operation itself as value-neutral or merely ‘technical’. The Coun-
cil itself notes that intelligence-led law enforcement includes the setting 
of political priorities.65 The question should be asked to what extent this 
should be the task of unaccountable working groups or non-majoritarian 
bodies. Since operational co-ordination does not entail the introduction 
of legally binding acts, it escapes not only democratic but also judicial 
scrutiny. The more general concern that regulatory agencies ‘might stray 
into areas more properly the domain of the policy-making branches of 
the EU’ is equally valid in relation to those agencies that have the task of 
co-ordinating operational activity.66    
61  V Guiraudon, ‘The EU “garbage can”: Accounting for policy developments in the immi-
gration domain’ Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison, 29 
May-1 June 2001, 13.
62  Walker (n 10) 22.
63  These sensitivities may be particularly strong for some of the EU10 Member States, who 
only regained their full national sovereignty at the end of the Cold War. Monar (n 27) 178.
64  C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1985) 2.
65  Council, Architecture of Internal Security, Document 9596/1/06 REV1, 22 May 2006, 3.
66  Commission (EC), ‘Commission Communication on European Agencies - The way for-
ward’ (Communication) COM (2008) 135 ﬁ nal, 11 March 2008, 6.
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Lastly, Member States may fail to appreciate the extent to which 
operational co-operation may ‘penetrate national systems and challenge 
statist prerogatives.’67 This may relate to both the organisation of Member 
States’ law enforcement agencies, as well as the way in which they oper-
ate. In the ﬁ eld of management of the external borders, clear examples of 
both can be found in the Commission Communication on the setting-up 
of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).68 First, it ‘invites’ 
Member States to set up ‘one single co-ordination centre’.69 Second, it 
refers to the establishment of a group of experts that should draw up 
guidelines for the tasks of and co-operation between these national co-
ordination centres.70 
The Court has never explicitly recognised a principle of institutional 
autonomy as such, but it has held in relation to Member States’ imple-
menting powers that in the absence of Community legislation it is up to 
each state’s constitutional system how these powers are exercised and 
to which speciﬁ c national bodies they are entrusted.71 One may wonder 
if Community legislation could fully pre-empt Member States’ powers. 
Article 4(2) TEU states that the Union shall respect Member States’ na-
tional identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government, and state 
functions, including safeguarding national security. This seems to sug-
gest that the institutional autonomy of the Member States constitutes a 
more fundamental value.72 An example of how respect for this principle 
may be ensured in legislation can be found in the EBF. This decision al-
lows Member States to designate several certifying and audit authorities 
or delegated authorities for the implementation of the money provided 
by the fund, on the condition that there is ‘a clear allocation of functions 
for each of these authorities.’73 While it seems nevertheless obvious that 
67  Walker (n 10) 22.
68  Commission (EC), ‘Commission Communication examining the creation of a European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’ (Communication) COM (2008) 68 ﬁ nal, 13 Febru-
ary 2008.
69  Currently, about 50 authorities from over 30 institutions have responsibilities in the 
surveillance of the southern external maritime borders. Commission (EC) (n 68) 6. 
70  Commission (EC) (n 68) 7.
71  Joined Cases 51-54/71 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit [1971] ECR 1107 para 4.
72  Barbier-Le Bris considers the institutional autonomy of the Member States to be a prin-
ciple of Community law. She has argued, with reference to the equivalent of this article 
in the Constitutional Treaty, that Community legislation cannot make the principle fully 
devoid of its content: M Barbier-Le Bris, ‘Les Principes d’autonomie institutionelle et procé-
durale et de coopération loyale. Les Etats membres de l’Union européenne, des Etats pas 
comme les autres’ in Le Droit de l’Union en principes - Liber Amicorum en l’honneur de Jean 
Raux (Editions Apogée, Rennes 2006) 451-452
73  Recital 25, Decision 574/2007/EC (n 30). See also Articles 12 and 27 of the Decision. 
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legislation can at least limit Member States’ institutional autonomy, the 
question is to what extent operational co-operation should be allowed to 
do the same.74
One of the characteristics of the different forms of operational co-or-
dination that have emerged under the AFSJ is that they originate in prac-
tical co-operation arrangements between the law enforcement agencies 
of a number of individual Member States. Monar has argued that these 
‘common, rather informal structures, play an important role as points 
of encounter and information exchange between ofﬁ cials from different 
Member States, especially after enlargement.’75
It would seem logical to assume that legislation on operational co-
operation forms the codiﬁ cation of bottom-up developments. Very often, 
however, on-the-ground co-operation originates in and is co-ordinated 
by Council working groups, which consist of senior law enforcement staff 
of the Member States.76 Curtin has in this respect highlighted the evolv-
ing autonomous executive role of the Council and other non-majoritar-
ian bodies alongside the Commission.77 At the same time, in the area of 
external borders management, there is an increasingly important role 
for the Commission as policy initiator and Frontex as co-ordinator of 
operational activities. The JHA agencies have recently emphasised the 
importance of being heard in the legislative process.78 This would ensure 
that where amendments are made to their structure or tasks, account 
is taken of their speciﬁ c needs and experience. Although agencies are, 
of course, important stakeholders in the legislative process, care should 
be taken that they are not allowed to dictate it, thereby setting their own 
rules and potentially pursuing their own agendas rather than the general 
interest.
74  In addition to the more principled argument made above in relation to the nature of 
competences in the AFSJ, further arguments can be made similar to those advanced by 
Hatzopoulos in relation to the Open Method of Co-ordination: V Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the 
Open Method of Coordination Is Bad For You: A Letter to the EU’ (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 3, 316 ff. See also the European Parliament Resolution on institutional and legal 
implications of the use of ‘soft law’ instruments of 28 June 2007 (A6-0259/2007).
75  J Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs after the 2004 Enlargement’ (2003) 38 International 
Spectator 1, 16.
76  See H Aden, ‘Administrative Governance in the ﬁ eld of EU Police and Judicial Coopera-
tion’ in Hofmann and Türk (eds), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
2006) 351. This is true as much for the Third Pillar as it is for the ﬁ eld of external borders 
management under the First.
77  D Curtin, ‘European Union Executive Actors Evolving in the Shade?’ in J De Zwaan, J 
Jans and F Nelissen (eds), The European Union - an Ongoing Process of Integration, Liber 
Amicorum A. Kellerman (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 99-101.
78  Summary of discussions of the meeting of the JHA Agencies (18 June 2008), Council 
Document 11644/08, 9 July 2008, 2.
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Operational co-operation is generally given a legal basis once a cer-
tain level of trust has been achieved and there is the need to remedy the 
shortcomings of a more intergovernmental approach, linked to concerns 
about transparency and accountability, but also compliance and co-or-
dination. Frontex forms a point in case in this respect. The Council in 
its more recent Draft Conclusions on the principle of convergence and 
the architecture for internal security, seems to show for the ﬁ rst time a 
greater sensitivity to the need for a legislative dimension to operational 
co-operation in JHA. It not only calls for closer co-operation between per-
sonnel and the harmonisation of equipment and practice, but also for the 
harmonisation of legal frameworks, including the establishment of com-
mon legislative instruments ‘where these represent added value for the 
Member States.’79 In the case of EUROSUR, however, future legislation is 
likely to conﬁ rm rather than shape its development, considering that im-
portant steps have already been taken under the heading of operational 
co-ordination. This is to be regretted, since projects of such importance, 
not least ﬁ nancially, deserve a proper legislative iter guaranteeing ac-
countability and legitimacy.
It should be recalled that even where legislation is adopted for the 
purpose of fostering operational co-operation, this does not detract from 
the intrinsically operational nature of law enforcement tasks themselves. 
For this reason, the operational dimension of the AFSJ will remain a 
prominent feature under Title IV EC as far as the management of the 
external borders is concerned. 
Operational co-operation in the AFSJ has the speciﬁ c characteristic 
that it focuses on compliance with national rules and regulations rather 
than Community legislation. This is particularly so under the Third Pil-
lar. However, even when operational co-operation aims to ensure compli-
ance with Community legislation, such as the SBC, it does not of itself 
create rights and obligations for third parties. An example here is a joint 
patrol carrying out border surveillance in the context of a Frontex joint 
operation attempting to prevent irregular border crossings.  
It should be stressed that in the AFSJ neither the Commission staff 
nor the staff of any of the agencies, be it under the First or Third Pillar, are 
endowed with autonomous law enforcement powers, let alone powers of 
coercion. In reality, operational activity at the EU level is therefore limited 
to the co-ordination of operational activities of national law enforcement 
agencies by EU bodies and institutions. Article 66 EC clearly refers to 
the co-operation in the areas covered by Title IV EC as being between the 
relevant departments of the administrations of the Member States. Like-
79  Council, ‘Draft conclusions on the principle of convergence and the architecture for in-
ternal security’ Council Document 13459/08, 24 September 2008, 3-4.
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wise, Article 30(1)(a) EU provides that police co-operation shall include 
operational co-operation between competent authorities. Neither does 
co-ordination at EU level replace bi- or multilateral initiatives between 
Member States themselves. This is underlined in the Frontex Regulation 
in Article 2(2), as well as in Article 16(3) of the SBC. The Lisbon Treaty 
would include a provision to this effect in Article 73 TFEU.
The Court has long held that ‘only measures, the legal effects of 
which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the appli-
cant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position may be the 
subject of an application for annulment.’80 The fact that the co-ordina-
tion of operational activities does not entail the taking of such measures, 
means these activities escape review by the EJC.81 The extension of the 
Court’s jurisdiction in the Lisbon Treaty to review the acts of bodies, of-
ﬁ ces and agencies of the Union would not change this.82 
The non-binding nature of operational activities vis-à-vis third par-
ties does not mean that in the course of such activities rights and obliga-
tions cannot arise. For instance, if during a joint patrol a police ofﬁ cer 
arrests a suspected criminal or a border guard denies a third country na-
tional access to EU territory, this of course has effects in law. In the ﬁ rst 
case, however, the decision is taken on the basis of national law. In the 
second case, it is taken on the basis of the SBC, but by law enforcement 
personnel endowed with public authority on the basis of national law.83 
Here it should, however, be noted that border guards from one Member 
State that participate in a joint operation/the deployment of a Rapid Bor-
der Intervention Team in another Member State may use force in accord-
ance with the rules and regulations of the guest Member State.84
Importantly, operational activity could constitute a tort or criminal of-
fence under Member States’ domestic law. Here one could think of the (ac-
cidental) sinking of migrant boats or the shooting of irregular border cross-
80  Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639 para 9.
81  See the preparatory work done by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA), an EC body 
in the ﬁ eld of pharmaceuticals regulation: Case T-326/99 Nancy Fern Olivieri v Commission 
and EMEA [2003] ECR II-6053 para 53.
82  TFEU art 263. A possible exception would be that a Member State could in theory chal-
lenge an operational plan which established the modus operandi for a joint operation as a 
decision. The Treaty amendment aimed, however, to provide a legal basis for the possibility 
of appealing against decisions made by regulatory agencies with decision-making powers 
(such as, for instance, the Ofﬁ ce for Harmonisation in the Internal Market - Trademarks 
and Designs).  
83  Under Article 13(2) SBC (n 29) and Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (n 35) Article 
10(10), only national border guards can take the decision to refuse entry.
84  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (n 35) art 10(6); Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
(n 36) art 6(6).
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ers. This possibility is recognised in the RABIT Regulation which for the 
purpose of civil and criminal liability equates visiting border guards with 
national border guards.85 A wrongful act that would be directly imputable 
to the co-ordinating activities of the EU could result in the non-contractual 
liability of the EU on the basis of Article 288(2) EC. This non-contractual 
liability extends beyond the institutions to other Community bodies estab-
lished by the treaties. Community legislation often speciﬁ cally provides for 
non-contractual liability in similar terms to those of Article 288(2) EC, for 
instance in the founding regulations of many EC agencies.86 
Under the International Principles of State Liability, Member States 
could be held responsible for fatalities that are a direct result of speciﬁ c 
border control measures.87 A parallel responsibility of the EU, under the 
Principles of the Responsibility of International Organisations, could be 
assumed where these measures are a direct result of the EU’s co-ordinat-
ing activities.88 Member States could furthermore be held responsible for 
violations of human rights in the course of operational activities under 
the European Convention on Human Rights.
The approach taken above regarding the possible responsibility of 
the EU for its co-ordinating activities is of course theoretical. For in-
stance, in the case of wrongdoings by Member States’ border guards in 
the course of Frontex co-ordinated operational activities, it would be very 
difﬁ cult to actually attribute responsibility to the EU. However, it may be 
argued that whenever the EU acts as a co-ordinator of operational activ-
ity, it has a positive obligation to ensure that all participating Member 
States fully respect fundamental rights, such as the right to life. This is 
all the more so, bearing in mind that respect for these rights is one of the 
Union’s foundational values listed in Article 6 EU, one of the Copenhagen 
criteria for accession and a condition in the Union’s external relations 
with Third Countries.89 
One could argue that the ECJ should have the right to review Mem-
ber States’ operational activities during joint operations. Of course, the 
limitation of jurisdiction in Article 68(2) EC and Article 35(5) EU could be 
85  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (n 35) arts 10b and 10c; Regulation (EC) No 
863/2007 (n 36) arts 10 and 11.
86  See for instance, Council Regulation 2007/2004 (n 35) art 19(3).
87  See T Spijkerboer, ‘The Human Cost of Border Control’ (2007) 9 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 1, 137. ILC Draft Articles on responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts, ICL Report of 53rd Session, A/56/10, 2001, ch IV.
88  ILC Draft Articles on international responsibility of international organisations, ILC Re-
port of 56th Session, A/59/10, 2004, ch V.
89  As evidenced by the systematic inclusion since 1992 of a clause in its agreements with 
third countries deﬁ ning respect for democratic principles and human rights clauses as an 
‘essential element’. 
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used as an argument against the Court exercising jurisdiction over the 
operations of Member States’ border guards, leaving the responsibility 
therefore with the Member States’ courts and eventually the European 
Court of Human Rights. However, if one applies by analogy the Court’s 
established case law in relation to Member States’ national rules to Mem-
ber States’ operational activities, these latter would have to be compatible 
with fundamental rights as an obligation of Community law as soon as 
they fell within the scope of Community law. This would be the case for 
the management of the external borders.90 More cautiously, one could 
argue that the Court should assume jurisdiction when there are indica-
tions of ‘serious and persistent violations, which highlight a problem of a 
systematic nature in the protection of fundamental rights in the Member 
States’, since such situations could effectively undermine the EU’s policy 
for the management of the external borders.91 
4. Innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty
In what respect does the Lisbon Treaty change the legal framework 
outlined in the previous section? Most importantly, of course, the Lis-
bon Treaty will merge the First and Third Pillars, making co-decision the 
standard legislative procedure for the whole AFSJ and as such complet-
ing the process of communitarisation of competences in JHA. Under the 
Constitutional Treaty, the ECJ would have immediately been given full 
jurisdiction over this whole policy area. The Lisbon Treaty delays this for 
a maximum of ﬁ ve years for those policy areas that currently fall under 
the Third Pillar. In addition, the special protocols on the position of the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark are now extended to cover the whole of the 
AFSJ.92 The possibility for the Court to review the legality and propor-
tionality of operations carried out by a Member State’s police or other 
law enforcement agencies or of the exercising of a Member State’s duty 
to maintain law and order and safeguard internal security remains ex-
cluded in Article 276 FEU. However, it would apply only to the chapters 
on judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police co-operation.
90  Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 
Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and 
others (‘ERT’) ECR-I 2925 para 42.
91  Opinion of 12 September 2007 of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-380/05 
Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità per le garanzie nelle comu-
nicazioni and Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del Ministero delle 
Comunicazioni ECR-I 349 para 22. 
92  Under the transitional arrangements, the UK may, at the latest six months before the 
expiry of the transitional period, notify the Council it will not accept the powers of the insti-
tutions for measures falling under the old Third Pillar, which will then cease to apply to the 
UK, after which the UK may, however, decide to opt in again with regard to these measures 
under the Protocols applicable to the UK in the Schengen acquis and Title IV FEC.
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In the ﬁ rst chapter of Title V TFEU, the general provisions applicable 
to the AFSJ as a whole, the link between the absence of internal border 
controls and the policy on the external borders is much less prominent 
in Article 67(2) TFEU than under Article 61(a) EC, attributing a more in-
dependent importance to each. Article 67(3) TFEU states that the Union 
shall strive for a ‘a high level of security’ through ‘co-ordination and co-
operation between police and judicial authorities and other competent 
authorities’. 
The current Title IV EC is only amended to a very limited extent 
and is clearly recognisable as such in Chapter 2 of Title V TFEU. Article 
74 TFEU almost literally repeats the formulation of Article 66 EC on ad-
ministrative co-operation. The legal basis for measures on the external 
borders is, however, reﬁ ned. Article 77(2)(b) refers to measures ‘concern-
ing the checks to which persons crossing external borders are subject’, 
while Article 77(2)(d) provides that the Union has competence to take ‘any 
measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated man-
agement system for external borders.’ 
It is interesting that the Treaty introduces the concept of an inte-
grated management system for external borders. This notion has so far 
been deﬁ ned only in the December 2006 JHA Council Conclusions and 
is, moreover, a very broad concept, including not only border control, but 
also inter-agency co-operation and the ﬁ ght against crime.93 It remains to 
be seen how far Article 77(2)(d) TFEU will allow for a move away from the 
exclusive focus on the movement of persons in respect of the crossing of 
the external borders. On the one hand, it could be argued that the article 
is sufﬁ ciently broadly formulated to serve as the legal basis, for instance, 
to extend Frontex’s competences to the ﬁ eld of police co-operation.94 On 
the other hand, one might insist that this should be done under the chap-
ter on police co-operation. Let us now consider how the Lisbon Treaty will 
affect executive action in general and operational co-ordination in the 
AFSJ in particular. One of the major innovations of the Constitutional 
Treaty was the introduction of a hierarchy of acts, explicitly distinguish-
ing for the ﬁ rst time between legislative and executive measures or rather 
‘legislative and non-legislative acts’. This distinction has been maintained 
by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 289(3) TFEU deﬁ nes as legislative acts, all 
legal acts that are adopted under legislative procedure.95 
93  JHA Council Conclusions, 4-5 December 2006, 15801/06 (Presse 341) 26.
94  EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator De Kerchove has called it ‘absurd’ that under the 
current legal framework Frontex cannot deal with security related threats other than ir-
regular migration: B Bulcke, ‘Europe is kwetsbaar voor Terrorisme’, De Standaard Online, 
11 September 2008 <http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=5h20a73f> 
last accessed 15 April 2008.
95  Legislative procedure as such is not deﬁ ned in the TFEU. From Articles 289(1) and (2) 
it follows, however, that it covers the adoption of a Regulation, Directive or Decision under 
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There are two types of non-legislative act. First, Article 290(1) TFEU 
provides that the legislator can by legislative act delegate to the Com-
mission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application 
to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative 
act, so-called delegated acts. Second, under Article 291(1) ‘where uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed’, these 
acts shall confer on the Commission the power to adopt implementing 
acts.
The Convention Working Group on Simpliﬁ cation ‘broached the idea’ 
of introducing in the Constitutional Treaty the possibility of assigning the 
task of adopting certain implementing acts to decentralised agencies (or 
‘regulatory authorities’).96 Neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Lis-
bon Treaty, however, make any reference to the execution of Union legis-
lation by agencies, effectively ignoring an important institutional reality 
in the EU. A sound legal basis in the Treaty for the delegation of powers to 
these agencies is still lacking. Curtin has rightly remarked that the Con-
stitutional Treaty fell short of ‘constitutionalising’ a framework for the 
administration of the Union as a whole. This observation applies equally 
to the Lisbon Treaty, not only in respect of delegated and implementing 
powers, but also operational activity.97 
While the Convention’s Working Group on Simpliﬁ cation examined 
the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, the Working 
Group on the AFSJ grappled with the question of how to better separate 
the legislative and operational tasks of the Council.98 The Working Group 
did not, however, attempt to deﬁ ne either of the two concepts. The legis-
lative tasks of the Council appear to have included the implementation 
of legislation as well.99 This deﬁ nition would seem to be based on sub-
stantive rather than formal criteria, namely the legal effect vis-à-vis third 
parties. 
ordinary legislative procedure (the current co-decision laid down in Article 290 TFEU) or 
special legislative procedure (limiting the role of either the Parliament or the Council to ‘par-
ticipation’, the particular modalities of which are to be found in the respective legal bases 
throughout the Treaty). Note that the deﬁ nition of legislative acts is a formal one. 
96  European Convention Working Group IX on Simpliﬁ cation, Final Report (‘Amato Re-
port’), CONV 424/02, 29 November 2002, 12. 
97  D Curtin, ‘Mind the Gap: The Evolving EU Executive and the Constitution’, Walter van 
Gerven Lecture 3 (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2004) 7.
98  European Convention Working Group X on Freedom, Security and Justice, Final Report, 
CONV 426/02, 2 December 2002, 3.
99  House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, ‘The Future of Europe: Con-
stitutional Treaty - Draft Article 31 and Draft Articles from Part 2 (Freedom, Security and 
Justice)’ HL (London, 16th Report of Session 2002-2003, 27 March 2003) 16.
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The Working Group proposed a merging of the various Council work-
ing groups dealing with internal security and removing CATS from the 
legislative process, limiting its role to sole co-ordinator of operational co-
operation.100 Article 68 TFEU now states that the European Council shall 
deﬁ ne the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning 
within the area of freedom, security and justice. Article 71 TFEU provides 
for the setting-up of a Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), 
replacing CATS, which should ‘ensure that operational cooperation on 
internal security is promoted and strengthened.’ It should ‘facilitate’ the 
co-ordination of the activities of Member States’ competent authorities. 
This seems to be a weaker formulation than if the article had stated it 
could co-ordinate activities itself. COSI’s functioning would be without 
prejudice to the powers of COREPER. Representatives of relevant Union 
bodies, ofﬁ ces and agencies could be involved in its proceedings and both 
the European Parliament and national parliaments would have to be kept 
informed.
COSI has been criticised by some as an EU interior ministry in the 
making,101 by others as a toothless standing committee,102 and again oth-
ers have asked whether it is necessary at all to formally provide for such 
a committee.103 Considering its potentially important role in the JHA, the 
mentioning of COSI in the Treaty seems justiﬁ ed. Bearing in mind that 
the EU is a system of attributed competences, it is difﬁ cult to see under 
which other legal basis the operational activities of the Council could ﬁ nd 
their foundation. In this respect, the article on COSI lacks precision and 
it will largely be left to the Council to decide on the exact deﬁ nition of its 
tasks and composition.   
In a Council Document mapping the preparatory work for COSI, in-
ternal security was broadly deﬁ ned as encompassing both crime preven-
tion and control, and anti-terrorism, but also the provision of an integrat-
ed management system for external borders as a major factor in prevent-
100  European Convention Working Group X (n 98) 16. See for an overview of the Council’s 
working party structure: J Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ in G Edwards and G Wiessala 
(eds), JCMS The European Union 1999/2000: Annual Review of Activities (Blackwell, Oxford 
2000) 137; M Den Boer and W Wallace, ‘Justice and Home Affairs - Integration through 
Incrementalism?’ in H Wallace and W Wallace (eds), Policy Making in the European Union 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 515; Council, List of Council Preparatory Bodies, 
Council Document 11301/08, 17 July 2008.
101  T Bunyan, ‘The Creation of an EU Interior Ministry’ (Statewatch News, April 2003) 3 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/TBART.pdf> last accessed 15 April 2009.
102  A Townsend, ‘Can the EU Deliver in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (2003) 
EPIN Working Paper No 9, Brussels, September 2003, 11.
103  J Monar, ‘A new “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” for the Enlarged EU? The 
results of the European Convention’ in K Henderson, The Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the Enlarged Europe (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire 2005) 127.
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ing (certain) forms of crime within the EU.104 Operational co-operation 
was deﬁ ned as ‘action related to concrete cases/events/crisis/phenom-
ena, that require a trans-national approach, whereby all the concerned 
authorities of the Member States competent at national level for internal 
security issues collaborate with each other, i.e. bodies.’105 
It was however immediately emphasised that COSI would not be 
directly in charge of conducting operational activities. The document pro-
vided three different options in terms of tasks for the new Committee. The 
ﬁ rst would limit COSI’s tasks to operational planning. The second would 
also include strategic functions, such as the drawing-up of an EU plan 
for internal security, evaluation and external relations. A ﬁ nal option, 
contrary to the history and wording of the article, would reintroduce a 
role in the legislative process.106 In any case, were legislative tasks to re-
main outside the Committee’s remit, a separate committee could be made 
responsible for the co-ordination of all legislative work related to ‘internal 
security’. This would imply that the four-level structure of lawmaking in 
the Council in the AFSJ will remain intact under the new Treaty.107 
The composition of COSI would depend on the tasks given to it, but 
the Council has contemplated residential, permanent members. Repre-
sentatives of EU bodies and agencies would only be present depending on 
the subject matter on the agenda. Interestingly, in the run-up to the es-
tablishment of COSI, the Hague Programme had called upon the Council 
to organise half-yearly meetings of the chairpersons of SCIFA and CATS, 
and representatives of the Commission, Europol, Eurojust, the European 
Border Agency (ie Frontex), the Police Chiefs’ Task Force, and the Joint 
Situation Centre (SitCEN), thus giving a more permanent position to the 
agencies.108 
When ‘no’ votes halted the ratiﬁ cation process of the Constitutional 
Treaty, the Council considered it inappropriate to continue setting up 
104  Council, ‘Discussion paper on the future Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) 
- Constitutional Treaty, art III-261’ Council Document 6626/05, 21 February 2005, 2.
105  Council Document 6626/05 (n 104) 2.
106  The Commission had also expressed the view that ‘[t]he COSI should not have legislative 
tasks’: Council ‘Strengthening security structuring operational police and judicial coopera-
tion at European Union level (doc 16397/04 JAI 576 CATS 61) - Outcome of Article 36 Com-
mittee meeting of 17/18 January 2005’ Council Document 5573/05, 21 January 2005.
107  Working group - CATS/SCIFA - Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) - 
Council; Monar (n 100) 135. 
108  Hague Programme, Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 Novem-
ber 2004, point 2.5. SitCen had originally dealt mostly with Second Pillar measures, moni-
toring on a constant basis potential threats. It has however expanded its remit into Justice 
and Home Affairs, providing strategic intelligence-based assessments on counter-terrorism 
matters: House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, ‘After Madrid: the EU’s 
response to terrorism’ HL (2004-5) Fifth Report, 61.
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such a body.109 No new structures should be created and reference to 
COSI was to be avoided.110 Rather, existing structures should be strength-
ened and made more efﬁ cient. A pilot project was set up in the ﬁ eld of 
organised crime, essentially proposing ways of bringing together chiefs 
of police and CATS, with the additional input of relevant agencies and 
working groups. Here one may raise a question as to Frontex’s involve-
ment. Until the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, Frontex competences are 
limited to those under the First Pillar. Although this in itself does not 
stand in the way of co-operation on issues such as irregular migration, 
its involvement in other activities aimed at ﬁ ghting crime would have to 
be considered beyond its remit.111 
The Council’s document on the Architecture of Internal Security and 
the Council’s Conclusions of 2008 seem to take only very small steps in 
the direction of a more centralised co-ordination of operational co-opera-
tion at EU level, referring once more to ‘better co-ordination’ and ‘contin-
uing reﬂ ection’ on the functioning of the Council’s working structures. At 
the same time, the six-monthly meetings between the JHA agencies and 
the presidencies of CATS and SCIFA have been in place since 2005 and 
have been intensiﬁ ed upon the recommendation of the Council.112 One of 
the ﬁ rst topics on the agenda was the exchange of information between 
these agencies. Importantly, it was decided by the heads of the EU JHA 
agencies that from now on the conﬁ dentiality rules/security regulations 
of other agencies, including those regulations governing classiﬁ ed infor-
mation, would be considered as equivalent.113 
The establishment of a Council Standing Committee on matters of 
internal security could cast an intergovernmental shadow over the man-
agement of external borders management, placing its co-ordination back 
into the sphere of inﬂ uence of the Council. Much will depend on the ﬁ nal 
shape of COSI. If it is to function as the sole co-ordinator of operational 
co-operation in the AFSJ, this role could clash with that of Frontex in the 
area of external border management, since this agency was set up for this 
109  Council (n 65) 1.
110  Council, Meeting on Coordination of Operational Cooperation: Summary of Discussion, 
Document 6290/06, 21 February 2006.
111  See in this respect the criticism by EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator De Kerchove 
(n 94).
112  Council, ‘Draft Conclusions on the future of Europol and Council recommendations 
implementing selected short term options’ Council Document 16831/06, 20 December 
2006, 5.
113  Council (n 78). Currently, information exchange between agencies is subject to conﬁ -
dentiality agreements. The obligation to conclude such agreements seems to ﬂ ow from the 
agencies’ own security regulations, which often copy the Council’s Security Regulations. 
These require the conclusion of a conﬁ dentiality agreement prior to the exchange of infor-
mation with third countries and/or international organisations.
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speciﬁ c purpose and has deliberately been given a degree of independ-
ence to fulﬁ l this task. If it is to take on more strategic tasks, it would 
essentially take over SCIFA’s current role under Title IV EC, potentially 
weakening the Commission’s recently acquired role of co-ordinating poli-
cy initiatives in the area of external border management.
5. Current developments
The fact that the ratiﬁ cation of the Lisbon Treaty in all Member States 
remains uncertain calls for a brief reﬂ ection on the future of the man-
agement of the external borders. Work on the integrated management of 
the EU borders is continuously under development, both in legislative 
and operational terms. In February 2008, the Commission tabled three 
communications which together were labelled ‘the EU Border Package’. 
The ﬁ rst Communication evaluates FRONTEX and considers its future 
development, the second is entitled ‘Preparing the next steps in border 
management in the European Union’, and the third examines the set-
ting-up of a European Surveillance System (EUROSUR).114 An in-depth 
discussion of these Communications would be beyond the scope of this 
article. For this reason, only a few elements will be highlighted here. 
First, the Communications are characterised by the importance that 
is attached in them to technological solutions for surveillance and in-
formation exchange, attempting to ‘virtually’ seal off the EU’s external 
borders. With regard to the next steps in EU border management, for 
instance, the Communication contemplates the possibility of introduc-
ing a system of registration for entry-exit for all third-country nationals, 
the use of automated gates at points of entry, a registered traveller sta-
tus, and also an electronic travel authorisation system. The Communica-
tion on EUROSUR focuses on the establishment of a permanent system 
of surveillance and information-exchange at the EU’s external maritime 
borders. 
Second, both the EUROSUR and Frontex Communication show a 
continued focus on operational co-operation. The idea of establishing a 
European Corps of Border Guards is not abandoned, although there is no 
speciﬁ c reference to such a corps. The Commission wishes to consider ‘to 
what extent coordination of Member States’ resources should be replaced 
with the assignment of border guards and equipment on a permanent 
basis.’115 It suggests that eventually the Agency itself might deploy border 
114  Commission (EC) (n 2); Commission (EC) (n 68); Commission (EC), ‘Preparing the next 
steps in border management in the European Union’ (Communication) COM (2008) 69 ﬁ nal, 
13 February 2008. 
115  Commission (EC) (n 2) 10.
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guards, calling, however, for a review of the Agency’s legal framework. 
Indeed, it must be asked on the basis of which treaty article these bor-
der guards would be endowed with public authority. The use of Article 
62(2)(a) EC, which only refers to standards and procedures, would in my 
view stretch the scope of this article too far. Arguably, with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 77(2)(d) TEU could serve as the legal 
basis for this purpose, but whether this would also be politically feasible 
is a different question. 
The Commission in its Communication on Frontex emphasises the 
importance of horizontal integration between border and customs au-
thorities in order to achieve integrated border management. The Hague 
Programme has already stated that an evaluation of Frontex should ex-
amine whether ‘the Agency should concern itself with other aspects of 
border management, including an enhanced co-operation with customs 
services and other competent authorities for goods-related security mat-
ters.’116 The Commission does appear rather reluctant in this respect, 
recommending merely a study on inter-agency co-operation and suggest-
ing joint operations of Member States’ border and customs authorities, 
co-ordinated by Frontex and the Commission. It seems that the Commis-
sion is reluctant to encroach upon the powers of its own DG Taxations 
and Customs. 
As an overall comment on the ‘border package’, it can be said that 
it lacks a critical evaluation of achievements made so far and does not 
present a comprehensive vision for the future development of this poli-
cy area.117 Importantly, it almost completely ignores the question of hu-
man rights and international protection during operational co-opera-
tion, which has been ﬁ ercely criticised by Jeandesboz.118 The 2002 Com-
munication was not only more ambitious, but also constituted a clear 
policy agenda. Instead, the 2008 Communications propose more of the 
same: increased powers for Frontex, intensiﬁ ed operational co-operation, 
more technological surveillance and additional data-collection. They do 
so without fully considering the implications of the measures proposed 
or their technical feasibility.119 Nonetheless, on at least one of the main 
116  Hague Programme (n 108) point 1.7.1.
117  See also E Guild, F Geyer and S Carrera, ‘The Commission’s New Border Package - Does 
it Take us One Step Closer to a “Cyber-fortress Europe”?’ (2008) CEPS Policy Brief No 154 
(March) Brussels.
118  J Jeandesboz, ‘Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU Borders: The Future Development of 
FRONTEX and EUROSUR’ (2008) Challenge Research Paper No 11 (August) Brussels, 18. 
119  It is for instance worrying that the Commission has proposed an entry-exit system twice 
already before, yet has never engaged in a thorough assessment of its technical feasibility: 
Commission (EC), ‘Communication on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability 
and synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs’ (Com-
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proposals, the introduction of an entry-exit system, there already seems 
to be broad agreement amongst Member States.120 The emphasis on op-
erational co-operation as a means of advancing integration in the AFSJ 
through practical co-operation rather than substantial legislation, as is 
the case for the development of EUROSUR, remains subject to the criti-
cism voiced above. 
6. Conclusion
Even if the Lisbon Treaty does not enter into force, most of the meas-
ures proposed in the Commission’s border package could still be adopted. 
However, it would be a lost opportunity for an increased democratic and 
judicial overview of the legislative measures that shape this policy. At the 
same time, one should realise that the focus of both this policy area and 
the AFSJ as a whole remains very much on the co-ordination of opera-
tional co-operation between national enforcement authorities, and that 
law enforcement activities are by their very nature operational tasks. 
It will be necessary to give more thought to developing a sound legal 
framework for the EU’s joint operational activity in the AFSJ as a whole 
and the management of the external borders in particular. This contribu-
tion has shown that the Lisbon Treaty, although distinguishing legisla-
tive acts from non-legislative acts, as well as legislative activity from op-
erational activity, fails to do so. It has been argued that although Member 
States’ judiciaries have the prime responsibility in ensuring respect for 
fundamental rights by their respective border-guard authorities, the ECJ 
should have a subsidiary power of judicial review when it comes to guar-
anteeing respect for the Union’s core values and their full effectiveness in 
the implementation of this Community policy. 
When the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the broad reformulation 
of the legal bases for the adoption of measures for the management of the 
external borders arguably leaves the Community legislator with consid-
erable leeway to adopt legislative measures for a truly integrated system 
munication) COM (2005) 597 ﬁ nal, 24 November 2005, 9; Commission (EC), ‘Communica-
tion on Policy priorities in the ﬁ ght against illegal immigration of third-country nationals’ 
(Communication) COM (2006) 402 ﬁ nal, 19 July 2006, 6. 
120  See replies to a questionnaire from the Council Presidency: ‘Project for a system of 
electronic recording of entry and exit dates of third-country nationals in the Schengen area’ 
Council Document 13403/08, 24 September 2008. Nineteen Member States, including the 
UK and Ireland, who are not even participating in the EU’s external border policy, as well as 
the three SAC countries replied. Only two Member States (Slovenia and Romania) opposed 
the taking of biometric data, Lithuania’s answer was unclear and Hungary wanted the tak-
ing of biometric data only for those TCN under a visa obligation. Greece went as far as to 
argue the entry-exit system should extend even to EU citizens, which would be contrary to 
the EU free movement rules as they stand. 
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of external borders management. Practice would, however, need to show 
whether such measures would be adopted under the legal basis for the 
management of the external borders or under the chapter for police co-
operation. Moreover, it remains to be seen how far this legal competence 
would allow for the conferral not just of co-ordinating powers, but also 
executive powers concerning ‘EU border guards’. Although politically this 
would seem controversial, the possibility should not be excluded, bearing 
in mind the importance that Member States and the Community attach 
to tackling irregular migration.  
The Hague Programme will expire in 2010 and preparations for its 
follow-up, the Stockholm Agenda, to be adopted under the Swedish Presi-
dency, are underway.121 It is to be regretted that with regard to the exter-
nal borders policy, the ‘EU future group’, charged with the task of giving 
more thought to the future development of the AFSJ when the Hague Pro-
gramme ends, simply echoes the Commission’s border package.122 These 
Communications, however, lack a well-thought-through vision of the fu-
ture direction of the EU’s policy in this area. Whether the Lisbon Treaty 
will enter into force or not, it is desirable that the Stockholm Agenda 
gives clear guidance for the future direction of the AFSJ as a whole and 
external borders management in particular. If it does enter into force, 
it should give guidance on how the Community intends to use its com-
petences in this ﬁ eld and how it envisages the relationship between the 
former First and Third Pillars, not merely in terms of legislation but also 
in terms of operational co-operation. 
121  See, for instance, the public consultation on the future of the AFSJ launched by the 
Commission: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/0001/consul-
tation_questionaire_en.pdf> last accessed 15 April 2009.
122  Report of the Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Af-
fairs Policy (The Future Group), ‘Freedom, Security, Privacy - European Home Affairs in an 
Open World’ (June 2008) 36. The EU Future Group was established by the German Presi-
dency in 2007 and drafted recommendations for when the Hague Programme ends (2010) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/eu-futures-jha-report.pdf> last accessed 15 
April 2009.
